

# RSAConference™2023

San Francisco | April 24 – 27 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: AIR-M05

## Hunting Stealth Adversaries with Graphs & AI



#RSAC

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RSAConference™2023

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
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# Our Objective



Would you be able to **Detect a Stealth Adversary** moving through the network?

This is a tough challenge due to the inherent noise of non-malicious activity




# In past RSAC editions ...

## TOP 100 MALICIOUS EVENTS

We used ML to find anomalous/malicious logons



[www.ds4n6.io/rsac22](http://www.ds4n6.io/rsac22)



# Hunt Evil: Lateral Movement



<https://www.sans.org/posters/hunt-evil/>



Remote Desktop



Map Network Shares (net.exe)



Psexec



Schedule Tasks



Services



WMI/WMIC



PowerShell Remoting

# Hunt Evil: Lateral Movement



Remote Desktop

#RSAC

Stronger Together

## SOURCE

### EVENT LOGS

- `security.evtx`
  - **4648** – Logon specifying alternate credentials - if NLA enabled on destination
    - Current logged-on User Name
    - Alternate User Name
    - Destination Host Name/IP
    - Process Name
- `Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient%4Operational.evtx`
  - **1024**
    - Destination Host Name
  - **1102**
    - Destination IP Address

## DESTINATION

### EVENT LOGS

- `Security Event Log - security.evtx`
  - **4624** Logon Type 10
    - Source IP/Logon User Name
  - **4778/4779**
    - IP Address of Source/Source System Name
    - Logon User Name
- `Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS%4Operational.evtx`
  - **131** – Connection Attempts
    - Source IP
  - **98** – Successful Connections
- `Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational.evtx`
  - **1149**
    - Source IP/Logon User Name
      - Blank user name may indicate use of Sticky Keys
- `Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager%4Operational.evtx`
  - **21, 22, 25**
    - Source IP/Logon User Name
  - **41**
    - Logon User Name



# Hunt Evil: Lateral Movement



WMI/WMIC

#RSAC

Stronger  
Together

## SOURCE

### EVENT LOGS


- **security.evtx**
  - **4648** – Logon specifying alternate credentials
    - Current logged-on User Name
    - Alternate User Name
    - Destination Host Name/IP
    - Process Name

## DESTINATION

### EVENT LOGS

- **security.evtx**
  - **4624** Logon Type 3
    - Source IP/Logon User Name
  - **4672**
    - Logon User Name
    - Logon by an a user with administrative rights
- **Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity%4Operational.evtx**
  - **5857**
    - Indicates time of wmioprse execution and path to provider DLL – attackers sometimes install malicious WMI provider DLLs
  - **5860, 5861**
    - Registration of Temporary (5860) and Permanent (5861) Event Consumers. Typically used for persistence, but can be used for remote execution.

## Digital Forensic and Incident Response Pivoting Tool



- 🔍 Extracts and merges **LM** from 7 different **EVTX files**
- 🔍 Parses Squid **proxy events**
- 🔍 Extracts all LM from **PCAP files**
- ⚡ Quick and **low memory consumption**
- 📄 Loads different sources into a **Neo4J database**
- 🔍 Includes a **Cypher Playbook** to make investigations easy

<https://github.com/jupyterj0nes/sabonis>





# The New Challenge

- How to detect **Anomalies at Scale**?
- How to detect **Lateral Movement** in a network with hundreds or thousands of nodes?



# Threat Actor: Lateral Movement



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
**Stronger  
Together**

## THE POWER OF GRAPHS


All you need are graphs




# What is a graph?




# What are graphs for?



Time series




Images




Networks

# Lateral Movement on Graphs








# Graph Algorithms




# Graph Tools



- Graph Data Base Management System
- Graph Visualization Platform
- Graph Data Queries
- Graph Algorithm Catalogue
- ML for Graphs

<https://neo4j.com/product/neo4j-graph-database/>



# Neo4j: Data Loading

Convert .evtx to .csv


Import data & create  
a graph data map

Make queries &  
processing


```

1 LOAD CSV WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///evtx.csv" AS evtx
2 MERGE (src:Host {Name: evtx.source})
3 MERGE (dst:Host {Name: evtx.destination})
4 CREATE (src)-[l:link {date: date(evtx.time)}]→(dst)
5 MATCH ({Name: "11.22.33.44"})-[:link]-(connected) RETURN connected
6
7


```



<https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/hands-on-graph-analytics/9781839212611/>




# Neo4j: Lateral Movement Analysis



```

1 MATCH (a:User { userName: 'opfor' }),(b:Device { deviceName: 'Corp File Web Server' }), path = shortestPath((a)-[*]-(b))
2 RETURN path

```







# Initial Problem




Would we be able to detect **Lateral Movement** in complex networks?



For large amounts of data, visual analysis may **NOT** be effective.



**WE NEED AUTOMATIZATION**



# Initial Problem

Would **AI / ML** help in this intense and time-consuming task?



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**Stronger  
Together**


## MACHINE LEARNING FOR GRAPHS

**Stronger Together**





# The Challenge


Most of the existing ML algorithms are specialized in simple data types



VS



# Graph Data



A =

	$\alpha$	$\beta$	$\gamma$	$\delta$	$\epsilon$	$\zeta$
$\alpha$	0	1	1	1	0	0
$\beta$	1	0	1	0	1	0
$\gamma$	1	1	0	1	1	0
$\delta$	1	0	1	0	0	1
$\epsilon$	0	1	1	0	0	1
$\zeta$	0	0	0	1	1	0

Adjacency Matrix


X =

	f1	f2	f3	f4	f5
$\alpha$	Dark	Light	Light	Dark	Light
$\beta$	Black	Light	Dark	Dark	Light
$\gamma$	Light	Dark	Light	Light	Light
...					
$\zeta$	Black	Light	Dark	Dark	Light

Feature Matrix

# Node Embedding


## Map nodes in a graph to numerical features



Node Embedding



Classical ML Models




<https://towardsdatascience.com/graph-embeddings-how-nodes-get-mapped-to-vectors-2e12549457ed>



# Graph Neural Networks




**GNN** are a type of Neural Network capable of working with **graph data structures**



# Graph Neural Networks




**GNN** are a type of Neural Network capable of working with **graph data structures**




# Graph ML for Anomaly Detection

## How well are we able to rebuild the input?

**Anomaly detection based on the reconstruction error**  
[www.ds4n6.io/rsac21](http://www.ds4n6.io/rsac21)




## GRAPH AUTO-ENCODER



# Seq2seq ML Models

LSTM

TRANSFORMERS



# Tools for Graph Neural Networks

Take your data to  
**CHRYSALIS** and use  
the power of **AI** in  
your investigations.





# DS4N6 Project

**Our Mission:** Bring Data Science & Artificial Intelligence to the fingerprints of the average Forensicator and promote advances in the field.

ds4n6.io



Presented in ...

*THE CYBERSECURITY INDUSTRY COMES TOGETHER FOR RSA CONFERENCE.*

*I LOOK FORWARD TO SHARING INSIGHTS WITH YOU WHEN I PRESENT AT*

**RSA**Conference2022  
San Francisco & Digital | June 6 – 9

A logo for the 'TRANSFORM' event, featuring a stylized orange and red figure of a person at a podium, set against a background of colorful geometric shapes (triangles and polygons) in shades of yellow, green, and blue.

**TRANSFORM**

RSA Conference 2021

A logo for the 'RESILIENCE' event, featuring a blue background with a glowing green infinity symbol and the word 'RESILIENCE' in white capital letters.

**RESILIENCE**

Digital Forensics & Incident Response Summit & Training

Live Online

**SANS DFIR**

**ODSC WEST RECONNECT**  
Conference & Expo  
Nov 16th – 18th, 2021

Threat Hunting Summit & Training

Live Online

FREE SUMMIT: Oct 7–8  
TRAINING: Oct 11–16

**SANS DFIR**




# DS4N6

## Data Science & ML for DFIR Analysts



<http://www.ds4n6.io>

- CHRYSLIS**: Icon showing a brain with circuitry.
- D4ML**: Icon showing a human head profile with a neural network.
- HAM**: Icon showing a central 'MFT' box with arrows pointing to 'EVTX', 'PF', 'REG', and 'WEB'.
- ADversAry eMulator**: Icon showing a hooded figure with glowing green eyes and a target symbol.
- Daisy VM**: Icon showing a stylized star or flower shape with a circuit pattern.



## Python framework that provides high-level DS/ML functions to support incident response tasks

More information in:  
[ds4n6.io/chrysalis](https://ds4n6.io/chrysalis)





With only 7 functions take your forensic analysis to the next level

<code>whatis()</code>	Identifies the forensic data type of an object (DataFrame –df– or DataFrame Collection –dfs–).
<code>xread()</code>	Reads tool output data (e.g. Plaso output) and stores it in a df/dfs.
<code>xmenu()</code>	Selects a df from dfs, or a column from a df, displaying the selected data allowing manual analysis.
<code>xanalysis()</code>	Displays a menu with the advanced analysis functions available for the given data type (i.e. forensic artifact).
<code>xdisplay()</code>	Used to select the display settings for the df that will be displayed (max. rows, max. columns, etc.).
<code>simple()</code>	Simplifies forensic output (df) showing only the most interesting columns for analysis.
<code>xgrep()</code>	UNIX-like grep for the df world. Allows the user to search for a regular expression in a df column or full df.



## Ready to use DS Virtual Machine designed to carry out Data Science and Machine/Deep Learning Analysis on DFIR data

More information in: [ds4n6.io/daisy](https://ds4n6.io/daisy)



# Demo: Real Incident Data – Ransomware Attack




## Global Company

The attack could spread



## CONTI

TOP Threat Actor from Russia  
using Cobalt Strike



## Worldwide Scope

5k Servers + 350 DCs + 12k Laptops

# Demo Data



**+100**  
servers



**+10K**  
users



**+200K**  
events



**CONTI**

Intrusion + **Ransomware** deployment



**ML analysis** performed with CHRYSLIS



# Summary

Graph analysis is a powerful tool to detect patterns of anomalous activity

Machine Learning applied in Graphs automates the analysis and detection of anomalies


There are not many open source tools using ML in DFIR

DS4N6 is an open source project to bring the power of DS and ML to the community: CHRYSALIS, DAISY, etc.

The presented analysis shows how CHRYSALIS has been effective tool in real world incidents with FORTUNE 500 customers



# Apply





All the details about this talk:

[ds4n6.io/rsac23](https://ds4n6.io/rsac23)



**THANKS!!**

**DS4N6**



[ds4n6.io](https://ds4n6.io)



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[DS4N6](https://www.youtube.com/DS4N6)

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