

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2022

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## **TRANSFORM**

SESSION ID: OST-T08

## **CHRYSALIS: Age of the AI-Enhanced Threat Hunters & Forensicators**

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Founder of One eSecurity | Senior SANS Instructor

@j3ssgarcia



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# Our Objective

**Transform you into AI-Enhanced Threat Hunters/Forensicators to bring the power of AI in your day to day investigations.**

You do not need to be an AI expert, you will need **to learn what AI can do for you**, becoming familiar with the tools available and how to use them to suit their needs.



# The Big Question

AI is great. But, what can it do for a  
Threat Hunter / Forensicator?  
Would it be able to detect  
**Cobalt Strike?**  
What else can it do?








# ML OVERVIEW

# The Age of Data Science & Machine Learning



Helps us understand the big picture

It helps working with complex scenarios

- Classification
- Prediction
- Anomaly Detection
- Noise Filtering
- Clustering



# ML FOR DFIR USE CASES

# Where Can We Use Machine Learning in DFIR?




DF



TH - CHRYSALIS



CTI



Memory Analysis – Columbo



Malware – Malware Revealer



Logs - Deeplog







Network - Zeek



# ML & TH: Artifact Anomalies

Scheduled Tasks	Scheduled Tasks
No time sequence	Time sequence is important
Vanilla Autoencoder	LSTM Autoencoder





[ds4n6.io/rsac21](https://ds4n6.io/rsac21)

	level_0	Orig_Index	EventID_	AtName_	TaskName_	AtUserID_	ResultCode_	ActionName_	UserNC_	Hostname_
0	676274	676473	140	TaskUpdated	Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\system\$	mc80-sc-7813
1	676273	676472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
2	670275	670474	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\TratarTrazas	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
3	670273	670472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\SyncFolder	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
4	670271	670470	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\RestartDocpath	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
5	676275	676474	200	ActionStart	Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	C:\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCac...	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
6	666222	666421	140	TaskUpdated	Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	d4_null\xwt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106
7	665394	665593	140	TaskUpdated	Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	d4_null\xwt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106

# ML & Malware: Detection and Classification


## Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)



<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/the-rise-of-deep-learning-for-detection-and-classification-of-malware/>

# ML & Malware: Malware Revealer

- Malware detection using ML with pre-trained models
- Uses SqueezeNet and Logistic Regression models
- Extracts features using convolutional filters to classify them as malware



<https://www.ayoub-benaissa.com/blog/malware-revealer/>

# ML & Memory Forensics: Columbo

Used to identify specific patterns in compromised datasets

It uses Volatility 3 outputs applying ML algorithms to look for suspicious

You can use it with pslist, psscan, pstree, malfind, netscan, etc.



```
Information about process Number 3496

Possible process path or execution: C:\Users\Bob\AppData\Local\Temp\rad93398.tmp\UWkpjFjDzM.exe

Machine Learning model classifies C:\Users\Bob\AppData\Local\Temp\rad93398.tmp\UWkpjFjDzM.exe to be suspicious. Please consider its percentage scores shown below:
0 1
15.1 84.9

Process traceability coupled with time executions of each process

process UWkpjFjDzM.exe(3496)/2019-03-22-05:35:33.000000 executed by
wscript.exe(5116)/2019-03-22-05:35:32.000000 <- hfs.exe(3952)/2019-03-22-05:34:51.000000 <- explorer.exe(1432)/2019-03-22-05:32:07.000000 root process is 1308

3496 is a parent process of the following process(es):
ImageFileName PPID PID
cmd.exe 3496 4660
```

# ML & Logs: Deeplog

It learns from tagged data to classify as anomaly or normal entry

It helps to identify anomalies, using LSTM in large volumes of system logs

Used in IDS/Firewall logs to detect DDoS and Port scans

```
(deeplog_env) ds4n6@daisy:~/Downloads/deeplog_tests$ sh train.sh
[Epoch 1/10] average loss = 8.0148 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:04.2
[Epoch 2/10] average loss = 8.0144 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:03.6
[Epoch 3/10] average loss = 8.0140 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:03.8
[Epoch 4/10] average loss = 8.0136 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:03.0
[Epoch 5/10] average loss = 8.0132 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.6
[Epoch 6/10] average loss = 8.0128 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.5
[Epoch 7/10] average loss = 8.0124 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.8
[Epoch 8/10] average loss = 8.0120 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.8
[Epoch 9/10] average loss = 8.0116 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:04.8
[Epoch 10/10] average loss = 8.0112 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.9
```



# ML & Network Traffic: Zeek

- Customized in-depth monitoring far beyond the capabilities of traditional systems
- Perform clustering to find anomalies, setting apart outliers
- We can find threats in large data sets even when they're unknown



**David Hoelzer.** *Applied ML to Zeek.* Author of:

- **SEC503:** *Intrusion Detection In-Depth.*
- **SEC595:** *Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals.*

**Threat Hunting: Old Data New Tricks!**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCTz62fN8OA>

**Applying Machine Learning to Network Anomalies:**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOfgNd-qijl>

# ML & DF: Elastic

The Elastic Observability and Security solutions have preconfigured machine learning models

The screenshot displays the Elastic Anomaly Explorer interface. At the top, the breadcrumb navigation shows 'Machine Learning / Anomaly Detection' and 'Anomaly Explorer'. Below this, there are tabs for 'Overview', 'Anomaly Detection', 'Data Frame Analytics', and 'Data Visualizer'. The current view is 'Anomaly Explorer' for a job named 'dns\_data\_steal\_detectionv2'. A filter is applied: 'Filter by influencer fields... (destination.ip : 10.4.1.244)'. The interface is divided into several sections:

- Top Influencers:** Lists 'destination.ip' (10.4.1.244, 15), 'host.name' (test-env-emodonga, 16), and 'dns.question.etld\_plus\_one' (dnsTunneling.bad, 15).
- Anomaly timeline:** A horizontal bar chart showing anomalies over time from May 3 to May 31, 2020. A red box highlights this section. It shows an orange bar around May 10 and red bars around May 24 and May 29.
- View by:** Set to 'dns.question.etld\_plus\_one' with a limit of 10.
- Anomalies Table:** A table listing detected anomalies with columns for time, severity, detector, found for, influenced by, actual, typical, and description.

time	severity	detector	found for	influenced by	actual	typical	description
May 29th 2020	18	Detect tunneling and data exfiltration	dnsTunneling.bad	destination.ip: 10.4.1.244 dns.question.etld_plus_one: dnsTunneling.bad	66873	29.10034686446426	More than 100x higher

# ML & DF: Elastic – Use Case: DNS Exfiltration

### highest\_registered\_domain

- covertc2.com 84 11k
- spotify.com 68 780
- whatsapp.net 33 120
- nerd.dk 32 113
- cedexis-rada... 23 59
- berkeley.edu 23 23

time	severity ↓	detector	found for	influenced by	actual	typical	description
334				beat.hostname: HR02			
118				beat.hostname: NETWORK_TAP			
93	> April 8th 2020 ● 88	high_info_content(subdomain) over highest_registered_domain excludefrequent=all	covertc2.com	highest_registered_domain: covertc2.com	158140	17.24000160332901	More than 100x higher ↑
222							
71							



# ML on the Cloud: MSTICPy and Azure

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Azure Machine Learning Studio Designer interface. The top navigation bar includes 'Home > Designer'. The main area displays a 'New pipeline' section with several prebuilt modules: 'Image Classification using DenseNet', 'Binary Classification using Vowpal Wabbit Model - Ad...', 'Wide & Deep based Recommendation - Restau...', 'Regression - Automobile Price Prediction (Basic)', 'Regression - Automobile Price Prediction (Compare algori...', and 'Binary Classification with Feature Selection - Income...'. A data visualization window is overlaid on the interface, showing a bar chart titled 'Process names with Cluster > 1'. The chart displays the cluster size for various process names. A red box highlights the summary statistics: 'Number of input events: 190' and 'Number of clustered events: 24'.

processName	ClusterSize
conhost.exe	80
cscrip.exe	70
MusNotification.exe	5
conhost.exe	2
cmd.exe	2
appidcertstorecheck.exe	5
WmiPrvSE.exe	5
TlWorker.exe	2
DscRun.exe	5
pmfexe.exe	2

<https://github.com/microsoft/msticpy>

<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel>

# DS4N6



# Putting All Together: DS4N6

**Mission: Bring Data Science & Artificial Intelligence to the fingerprints of the average Forensicator and promote advances in the field**



Presented in



# DS4N6: The Road So Far

# DS4N6


ds4n6.io



CHRYSALIS



D4ML



HAM



ADversAry  
eMulator



Daisy VM

# CHRYSALIS

**Python framework that provides DS/ML functions to use without any specific DS/ML knowledge**

**Complete your investigations with only 7 functions!**

**More information in:**  
[ds4n6.io/chrysalis](https://ds4n6.io/chrysalis)



## CORE FUNCTIONS

Function	Usage	Type	Description
<b>whatis()</b>	whatis(obj)	CLI	Identifies the forensic data type of an object (DataFrame -df- or DataFrame Collection -dfs-)
<b>xread()</b>	xread(options)	GUI	Reads tool output data (e.g. plaso output) and stores it in a df/dfs
<b>xmenu()</b>	xmenu(obj)	GUI	Used to easily select a dataframe from dfs, or a column from a df, displaying the selected data and allowing manual (Excel-like) analysis on it
<b>xanalysis()</b>	xanalysis(obj, options)	GUI	Displays a menu with the advanced analysis functions available for the data type (i.e. forensic artifact) given
<b>xdisplay()</b>	xdisplay()	GUI	Used to select the display settings for the dataframes that will be displayed (max. rows, max. columns, etc.)
<b>simple()</b>	df.simple(options)	CLI	Simplifies forensic output (df) showing only the most interesting columns for analysis.
<b>xgrep()</b>	xgrep(obj, options)	CLI	UNIX-like grep for the DataFrame world. Allows the user to search for a regular expression in a DF column or full DF

# Try CHRYSALIS on the Cloud: Colab & Binder

ODSC\_TheStolenSzechuanSauceCase.ipynb

File Edit View Insert Runtime Tools Help Cannot save changes

Share DS

RAM Disk Editing

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- 1.3 Using DataFrames to View Evidence
- 1.4 Simple() Function
- 1.5 CONCLUSIONS:
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  - 2.1 Windows Events
  - 2.2 Windows Security Events
  - 2.3 plaso\_get\_evtxdfs() Function
  - 2.4 xanalysis() Function
  - 2.5 CONCLUSIONS:
- 3. CLOSER LOOK INTO DOMAIN CONTROLLER LOGONS
  - 3.1 Suspicious Logons
  - 3.2. Checking Failed Logons
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- 4. FAILED LOGONS
  - 4.1. Matplotlib
  - 4.2. Failed Logons Analysis**
  - 4.3. CONCLUSIONS:
- 5. LOOKING INTO THE FSTL & AUTORUNS
  - 5.1 Filesystem Timeline

• Select 4625 as DF to analyze

• Select Failed Logons info as the available analysis

xanalysis(secevtxdf\_srv)

**Analysys explorer:**

Analysis object: DataFrame Analysis type: evtx DF to analyze: 4625

Available analysis types: Failed Logons info Export Result to d4.out

Failed Logons

Timestamp	Failed Logons
2020-09-18 04:00:00	0
2020-09-18 05:00:00	0
2020-09-18 06:00:00	0
2020-09-18 07:00:00	0
2020-09-18 08:00:00	0
2020-09-18 09:00:00	0
2020-09-18 10:00:00	0
2020-09-18 11:00:00	0
2020-09-18 12:00:00	0
2020-09-18 13:00:00	0
2020-09-18 14:00:00	0
2020-09-18 15:00:00	0
2020-09-18 16:00:00	0
2020-09-18 17:00:00	0
2020-09-18 18:00:00	0
2020-09-18 19:00:00	0
2020-09-18 20:00:00	0
2020-09-18 21:00:00	0
2020-09-18 22:00:00	0
2020-09-18 23:00:00	0
2020-09-19 00:00:00	0
2020-09-19 01:00:00	0
2020-09-19 02:00:00	0
2020-09-19 03:00:00	20

0s completed at 1:48 PM


Try Colab now:  
[bit.ly/3Ff2V0m](https://bit.ly/3Ff2V0m)

Try Binder now:  
[bit.ly/3Ff2V0m](https://bit.ly/3Ff2V0m)



# D4ML

Easy-to-use ML functions that you can apply to your artifact dataframes.  
It can be implemented stand-alone or via xanalysis()



**find\_anomalies()**  
D4ML function to find anomalies  
via ML without knowing ML

	level_0	Orig_Index	EventID_	AtName_	TaskName_	AtUserID_	ResultCode_	ActionName_	UserNC_	Hostname_
0	676274	676473	140	TaskUpdated	\\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\system\$	mc80-sc-7813
1	676273	676472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
2	670275	670474	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\\TratarTrazas	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
3	670273	670472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\\SyncFolder	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
4	670271	670470	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\\RestartDocpath	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
5	676275	676474	200	ActionStart	\\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	C:\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCac...	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
6	666222	666421	140	TaskUpdated	\\Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	d4_null\xwt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106
7	665394	665593	140	TaskUpdated	\\Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	d4_null\xwt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106



# HAM / HAMML

**Model that harmonizes the output of different tools so the underlying artifact data has the same format regardless of the tool that generated it**

## Tools

- Kansa
- Kape
- Plaso
- Mactime
- Autoruns
- Macrobbber
- Volatility

## Artifacts

- Svslst
- Amcache
- Pslst
- Evtx
- Flist
- Winreg
- Fstl

**HAMML: HAM + Feature Selection + Feature Engineering**

# HAM / HAMML

## Unharmonized DataFrame

```
[10]: plaso_JSON.head()
```

```
[10]:
```

	event_0	event_1	event_2	event_3	event_4	event_5	event_6
__container_type__	event	event	event	event	event	event	event
__type__	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer
build_number	9600	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN
data_type	windows:registry:installation	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry
date_time	{ '__class_name__': 'PosixTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues', 'timestamp': 0}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}

xread()



## Harmonized DataFrame

Statistics:  
No. Entries: 72

HIDDEN COLUMNS		CONSTANT COLUMNS	
	0	Column	Value
0	__container_type__	D4_DataType_	nan
1	__type__	D4_Orchestrator_	nan
2	data_type	D4_Tool_	plaso
3	inode	D4_Plugin_	windows_shell_item_file_entry
4	parser	D4_Hostname_	
5	pevtnum	date_time	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}
6	message	hostname	DESKTOP-SDN1RPT
7	sha256_hash		
8	pathspec		

Timestamp_	timestamp_desc	display_name	file_reference	filename	long_name	name	origin	shell_item_path	timestamp	localized_name	pathspec_simple_
0	2019-12-07 09:03:46	Creation	NTFS:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat	\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat	Windows	Windows	HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\16	<My Computer> C:\Windows	1575709426000000	<NA>	[p3]\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat

# ADAM

**ADAM allows you to define a sequence of malicious artifact data and inject it in a dataframe to test the detection capabilities**

The DS ADversAry eMulator

Mimick real attacks

Inject events in multiple Artifact-specific Dataframes

Creates a “Virtual” DataFrame environment



# DAISY

Ready-to-use DS Virtual Machine designed to carry out Data Science and Machine/Deep Learning Analysis on DFIR data



	DFIR	
Data	D	
	A	Artificial
	I	Intelligence
Science	S	
	Y	



**i**  
More information in:  
[ds4n6.io/daisy](https://ds4n6.io/daisy)

# DAISY

## Forensics tools

# RegRipper

<http://github.com/keydet89>



# VOLATILITY



## DS4N6




# CHRYSALIS

## ML/DS tools



## Ready to use notebooks



## Forensic demo data




# Ali Hadi



# DAISY

[ds4n6.io/daisy](https://ds4n6.io/daisy)



# The Big Challenge

Would we be able to detect  
**Cobalt Strike**  
by just using  
**Machine Learning?**

Let's try!



# Use Case: Cobalt Strike Detection

## Platform for Red Teams operations and adversary simulations

3<sup>rd</sup> most common threat (Red Canary)

Beacons: Post exploitation payloads

Malleable C2: language to give control over the indicators in the Beacon payload

THREAT

# Cobalt Strike


Cobalt Strike continues to be a favorite C2 tool among adversaries, as many rely on its functionality to maintain a foothold into victim organizations.

#3

OVERALL RANK

7.9%

CUSTOMERS AFFECTED





# Demo Data

 30 days of **real world production server data**

 **+100** servers

 **+200K** events

 **Cobalt Strike** real events injected with ADAM

 **ML analysis** performed with CHRYSALIS





# Summary


Machine Learning could enhance the analysis, detection and responses typically performed by forensicators

There are not many open source tools using ML in DF

DS4N6 is an open source project to bring the power of DS and ML to the community: CHRYSALIS, DAISY, etc.

CHRYSALIS and the analysis presented have been used in real world incidents and with FORTUNE 500 customers

# Apply





All the details about this talk:  
[ds4n6.io/rsac22](https://ds4n6.io/rsac22)



# RSAC<sup>®</sup>Conference2022

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Thanks!

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